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Abstract 
This paper presents a general view of the telematic voting system developed by its 
authors, with a special emphasis on the important role that smart cards play in 
this scenario. The use of smart cards as basic pieces for providing secure 
cryptographic operations in this type of voting scheme is justified. The differences 
and advantages of Java Cards in comparison with the “classical” smart cards 
(those that completely conform to the ISO/IEC 7816 standard) are also discussed. 
As an example, the paper describes one of the applets implemented in the voting 
Java Card as part of the general telematic voting application.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Telematic voting systems are electronic voting systems in which the ballot box is 
remote and the voter uses computer networks to deliver the vote. This voting 
system provides the voters with many benefits, such as the ability of issuing the 
vote from many different voting points and the possibility of getting the election 
result quickly. Nevertheless, both voters and political parties do not accept this 
kind of voting system yet. The main reason of this rejection lies on the fact that 
they do not trust this type of system (Mercuri, 2001) (Internet Voting 
Report, 2000). 
Telematic voting systems, as other conventional voting methods do, must provide 
the users with some fundamental guarantees of security. It is necessary to assure 
the authentication of the voters and to simultaneously protect the anonymity of the 
voter at the moment of issuing the vote. It is also necessary to assure that each 
voter can only vote one time. Nevertheless, telematic voting systems must not 
only emulate the conventional voting methods but they must also be able to 
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handle new threads that may come from a malicious person, due to the fact that 
programs and digital information can be easily modified. In the design of 
telematic voting scenarios, this circumstance obliges to include appropriate 
countermeasures to address these risks and consequently to inspire the confidence 
of the citizens. For this reason, it is very important for the voters to have some 
type of receipt or digital “supporting document” that allows them to verify the 
vote that they have cast. In the telematic voting scenario developed by the authors 
(the VOTESCRIPT system1), the smart card is an essential and constituent 
element of the system. All the participants in the system, both voters and 
management authorities, need to use their personal smart cards to carry out the 
tasks defined by the system. 
As elements of the general system architecture, smart cards have three essential 
functions: 
a) To guarantee the authentication of the voter. Based in a set of keys and 
personal data stored in the card, the voter is able to demonstrate his or her 
right to participate in the election. Similarly, the different management 
authorities and supervisors of the system have their own smart cards to 
guarantee the proper authentication.   
b) To be a reliable device to carry out certain cryptographic operations. Smart 
cards that are able to execute public key algorithms strongly guarantee the 
security of the operations and the privacy of the voters, facilitating the 
anonymity of the chosen option. 
c) To properly protect personal data and keys. The operations of ciphering 
and signing using the private key are always carried out inside the card. As 
smart cards are tamper-resistant, keys and other sensible information 
generated during the voting process can’t be illicitly extracted from them.  
 
In this paper (in section 3 and 4) we discuss the restrictions of the use of 
“classical” smart cards (those which completely conform whit the ISO/IEC 7816 
standard (ISO/IEC 7816)), and we present the benefits provided by Java Cards. 
Java Cards are a valuable tool to improve the security of the system. Indeed, these 
cards offer system developers the facility of storing small applications (applets) in 
the memory card with the guarantee of integrity and inviolability that every 
confidential data stored in a smart card has. To emphasize the important role 
played by smart cards in the global behaviour of telematic voting systems, in 
section 2 of this paper we present a summarized description of our voting system, 
the VOTESCRIPT system. Finally, in section 5, we describe the implementation 
of one of the operations carried out by an applet in the voter smart card. This 
                                                 
1 This system has been developed within VOTESCRIPT projects (Secured Electronic Voting 
based on Advanced Cryptography) sponsored by National Council for Science and Technology of 
Spain (TIC2000-1630, TIC2002-4223 and TIC2003-2141) 
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description illustrates the structure and functionality of a APDUs (Application 
Protocol Data Units) used in communications between the applets stored in the 
smart card and the computer that acts as a voting terminal. 
2. SCENARIO OF COMMUNICATION 
The VOTESCRIPT system (Carracedo et. al, 2003) tries to support telematic 
voting in environments where all the votes are collected in a single ballot box, 
although we are working on its adaptation to environments in which the presence 
of multiple ballot boxes would be necessary. 
2.1 AUTOMATIC AGENTS AND SYSTEMS 
In the VOTESCRIPT communication scenario (Figure 1) a set of automatic 
systems takes part:  
o Authentication Points (APs). They are kiosks equipped with a card reader, 
wherein the voter is authenticated by the system as the first step of the voting 
process. 
o Ballot Points (BPs). They are cabins equipped with a card reader that helps the 
voter to issue his vote. In VOTESCRIPT, the voter can choose, during the 
authenticating process, any of the multiple existing APs and is able to issue 
the vote in any of the existing BPs. 
o An Administrator of authentication. This automatic agent sends back to the 
voter an authorization ticket that enables him to issue his vote on the Ballot 
Point. 
o Several Intervention Systems that complement the work of the Administrator. 
Every Intervention System is controlled by an Inspector, designated by each of 
the groups of voters or candidatures authorized to supervise the voting 
process. 
o A Ballot box that gathers the votes and gives back voting receipts to the 
voters. 
o A Counter for tallying the votes once the election has finished. 
o Verification Points which allow the voter to verify that his vote has been 
considered and counted correctly. 
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2.2 PARTICIPANTS  
The people who participate in the process are: 
o Voters. Every voter is in possession of a voting smart card that has been 
specially defined for VOTESCRIPT system. This card is able to carry out 
several cryptographic operations. 
o A Manager of the Administrator System. 
o Inspectors. Each Inspector manages one of the Intervention Systems. 
o An Election Authority who is in charge of the general control of the system 
and responsible to solve possible claims. 
The Administrator and the Intervention Systems, along with the Manager of the 
Administrator System and the Inspectors, constitute the equivalent, in this 
telematic system, to the conventional electoral board. 
2.3 KEYS AND IDENTIFIERS 
In a previous stage, before the election begins, each voter receives one voting 
smart card and a voter’s identifier. The voter must go to a specially assigned sites 
where the APs and BPs are installed, using his smart card to get the proper 
authorization from the Administrator and to thus be able to cast his vote. 
Figure 1. VOTESCRIPT system architecture 
Authentication 
Point 
Administrator Intervention 
Systems 
Ballot Box Counter
Ballot Point 
Verification 
Point 
Election 
Authority 
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The Administrator, the Intervention Systems, the Ballot box, the Counter and the 
Election Authority have a pair of keys (public and private). All these public keys 
are known by all telematic agents and all participants in the voting system. In 
addition, the voters have a pair of keys (public and private) stored in their cards 
before the election begins. The certificated public key is well known by all the 
telematic agents of the system and by the Election Authority. 
2.4 GLOBAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE SYSTEM 
Due to space constraints, we will not describe in this paper the detailed secured 
protocols through which the different system’s agents communicate. However, in 
order to understand the kind of tasks that have to be carried out using smart cards, 
a brief description of the global behaviour of the voting system that has been 
developed is presented next.  
First, the voter inserts his smart card into the Authentication Point in order to get 
the authorization to issue his vote. In order to do that an application, which could 
be called voter’s application, has been developed. This application will interact 
with both the voter and the Administrator agent. This agent is in charge of 
verifying the voter’s identity and checking that he has not yet voted. All the 
Intervention Systems carry on the same tasks although there is not direct contact 
between them and the voter. In case of positive matching, the Administrator will 
send back to the voter the requested authorization which will be stored in the 
smart card. 
Next, the voter will head for the Ballot Point carrying his card, where the voter’s 
application will ask him for the voting option. Afterwards, the selected option 
together with the authorization received in the previous step, will be sent to the 
Ballot Box. 
In order to allow the voter to verify that his vote has been properly considered, the 
Ballot Box will send him back a receipt with the information regarding the issued 
vote. At the end of the process, this receipt –stored in the card- provides the voter 
with enough proof to make a claim in case of disagreement with the results. 
Once the voting period has finished, a direct intervention of the Inspectors, the 
Manager of the Administrator System and the Election Authority will start the 
process of the Counter agent, guaranteeing the tallying process and the publication 
of the final results. 
Afterwards, a short period of time for the verification procedures will be opened, 
that is when the receipt could be used in case of disagreement with the results.  
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3. VOTING WITH SMART CARDS 
3.1 THE NEED TO HAVE AN ELECTRONIC SUPPORT FOR SECURED 
STORING: USE OF CLASSICAL SMART CARDS 
As mentioned in the preceding section, every entity participating in the ballot, i.e. 
voters and voting systems agents, must have its corresponding pair of a secret key 
and a public key (the last one provided in a certificate format). To guarantee the 
security of the voting system, voters and participant agents must keep the keys 
safe in an adequate manner. 
Moreover, as indicated previously, during the voting process two pieces of 
information are created (authorization ticket and voting receipt), both of them 
protected by cryptographic algorithms. These pieces must be stored in some kind 
of reliable and easily transportable support that could assure the availability of this 
information when required in the voting process. 
For that reason, it is necessary to be ready to have an electronic support for a 
secure and strong storage: we have concluded that a smart card is the most 
appropriate device to support this kind of storage. The smart card allows, on one 
hand, to keep safely the private keys of voters and agents so as to guarantee their 
identity; on the other hand, it permits to store the pieces of information that are 
generated along the process. 
In the initial stages of the development of the project the “classical” smart cards 
were used (those fully in accordance with the ISO/IEC 7816 standard). These 
cards were employed to perform two main actions: a) to hold the identifier and 
keys of the voters, as well as the information related to the voting process; b) to 
perform the signature/cipher of the information using the microprocessor that is 
included in this type of card. In this way it was possible to have a cheap and 
portable device which prevents the information stored inside from being read or 
modified in a fraudulent way. 
As mentioned before, the voter’s application is in charge of dialoguing with the 
voter to ask for his voting option and to carry out the secured dialogue among the 
different system’s agents. This process is undertaken by means of appropriate 
cryptographic operations.  
Due to the restrictions of the classical smart cards, in the initial stages of the 
development of the project, the voter’s application was located within the 
Authentication Point and the Ballot Point. This means that some cryptographic 
operations needed to authenticate the voters and to handle their votes must be 
carried out in these Points. However, there is a risk that malicious software loaded 
on the Authentication Point or the Ballot Point can change the voter’s vote 
without the voter noticing it (Rubin, 2001). Therefore, the loss of security during 
the whole process could be a real risk. 
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3.2 IMPROVING THE SECURITY: JAVA CARD 
The way to improve remarkably the security of the system is to make the most 
part of the voter’s application reside within the smart card. From a practical point 
of view, this solution is not feasible using a conventional smart card, but it can be 
obtained using a new generation of smart cards: Java Cards. In fact, these cards, 
besides pooling all the security requirements of the conventional smart cards, also 
allow the storage and later execution of different user applications, developed in 
Java language. This means that it is the suitable place for the voter’s application 
due to the new features of Java Card combined with the tamper-proof 
characteristics of any type of smart card. Therefore, this solution provides users 
with all the benefits of Java Card plus a high level of security and reliability.  
The introduction of Java cards allows improving the user’s authentication process. 
An inherent previous task in the use of smart card lies in the guarantee that the 
person who presents the card is, in fact, his rightful owner. In the previous version 
of the voting system, using classic smart cards, this authentication was obtained 
by means of a PIN. Using Java Cards, this mechanism is substituted by a stronger 
procedure, based on the existence of an applet for the storage and latter 
verification of the participants’ fingerprints (Maltoni et al., 2003). The biometric 
applet used in this system is Precise Biomatch™ J from Precise Biometrics. This 
applet is able not only to store the fingerprint of the card’s owner but also to 
implement the algorithms to verify (within the card) its validity (match-on-card). 
4.  JAVA CARD TECHNOLOGY 
In order to facilitate the subsequent explanation a brief introduction to Java Card 
technology is included in this section. 
A Java Card, like any other smart card, is a chip card with a microprocessor 
inside. The integrated circuit incorporated in the card contains a CPU and 
elements used for data transmission and storage. Essentially a Java Card is a smart 
card which is able to run applications, called applets, written in Java programming 
language. These applications run in the Java Virtual Machine called JCVM (Java 
Card Virtual Machine) (Hansmann et al., 2002) (Carracedo, 2004) (Ferrari et 
al., 1998). 
The physical appearance of the plastic substrate is fully compatible with those 
conventional smart cards which are in compliance with the international standard 
ISO/IEC 7816. Also the microprocessor architecture and the organization and the 
functionalities of the external contact points conform to that standard. 
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Figure. 2. Java Card logical architecture 
 
Figure 2 shows a simplified view of the Java Card logical architecture. The 
applications and data will be stored in the memory and the machine code will be 
executed by the microprocessor. Each manufacturer will incorporate a proprietary 
microprocessor with a proprietary internal architecture; therefore every program 
will run using a specific set of machine instructions. For that reason, the “native 
methods” box that appears in Figure 2 will match the particular features of each 
microprocessor and will support the JCVM as well as other classes of the Java 
runtime environment.  
JCVM interprets bytecode instructions, executes applets, enforces runtime 
security and manages objects and memory.  
The API (Application Programming Interface), logically located on the next upper 
layer, contains those classes which provide the supported services and the system 
applets themselves. The API includes the functions that could be invoked by the 
user applets as well as the required applications to download and install these 
applets in the card. 
The three layers (native methods, JCVM and API) constitute the card execution 
environment or JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment) that is in charge of the 
program execution and resource management. In other words, it is a sort of card 
operating system. 
To adapt a Java card to a specific application, the applets are firstly developed, 
implemented, tested and debugged in a conventional PC. After that, several 
applets can be installed in the card. As well as the standard smart cards, Java cards 
also hold a small room for memory and so, they only support a subset of the 
features of Java language.  
Concerning the APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) set defined in ISO/IEC 
7816-4, Java cards exclude APDUs related with file system access (internally 
controlled by the JCRE), and add new ones to support communication between 
applets and external programs. 
 
CAD 
Applet Applet Applet 
JCRE 
Native methods 
JCVM 
API 
APDU
APDU
COMPUTER 
CAD: Card Acceptance Device 
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4.1 APDUs  
As mentioned before, communication with Java cards is carried out by using 
APDUs. There are two different types of APDUs: commands, received by the 
card; and responses, sent by the card as a result of a command execution. The 
format of the two types is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. APDUs structure 
4.1.1 COMMANDS 
The commands have two parts: header and body (see Figure 3). The header is 
mandatory in every command. It consists of 4 octets with the following meaning: 
CLA: Class of instruction. It identifies a type of command.  
INS: Instruction code. It identifies the specific instruction of the command.  
P1 and P2: Parameters 1 and 2 provide further qualification to the instruction. 
 
The body has variable length and it is optional. Lc (1 octet) specifies the length of 
the Data field in octets. Data contains the information sent to the card to execute 
the instruction given in the header. Le (1 octet) indicates the number of octets 
expected in the response Data field returned by the card. 
4.1.2 RESPONSES 
As in commands, the responses have two parts: one mandatory and the other 
optional. The mandatory part consists of 2 octets, SW1 and SW2, called status 
words, which represent the execution result, that is to say, the card status after the 
command execution. For example, the values SW1=0x90 and SW2=0x00 indicate 
that the command execution has been successfully completed in the card. The 
Data field is the optional part and it contains the results of the requested 
operation. The length of this field is constrained by the Le field in the command 
that originated this response. 
Mandatory header Optional body 
Command 
Response 
Mandatory trailer 
Optional 
body 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
Data SW1 SW2 
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There are four possible combinations of commands and responses in APDUs, 
depending on whether the Data field is present or not; as it is shown in Figure 4. 
The use of a given combination will be determined by the communication needs.  
 
Figure 4. Combinations of commands and responses 
5. EXAMPLE OF AN OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY THE JAVA CARD 
The following description details an example of the operations executed by the 
Java Card. This example is presented as a case study to illustrate the power of the 
operations that can be carried out using Java Card technology. Particularly, we 
describe the operations between the smart card and the Authentication Point in 
order to allow the voter to get the authorization to vote from the Administrator. 
All the operations that make possible the interaction among the voter, his or her 
Java Card and the Administrator in charge of the voters authentication are 
described. Figure 5 shows those interactions across the Authentication Point. 
 
Figure 5. Simplified scheme of the interaction among the voter, his Java Card and 
the Administrator 
On behalf of the voter, his smart card will fulfill all the tasks needed to generate 
the pieces of information that are going to be sent to the Administrator, so that all 
Administrator 
Voter 
Card 
Authentication Point
Authorization 
request 
Response  
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Case 4 
Header SW 
Header Le Data SW 
Header Lc Data SW 
Header Lc Data Le Data SW 
APDU Command APDU Response 
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critical information is processed inside the card in a protected mode that ensures 
the confidentiality of both data and operations. 
The dialog between the Authentication Point and the Administrator is performed 
by means of messages, which are the result of the application of complex 
cryptographic operations. The Authorization request is a piece of information 
containing the following information:   
AdP [kdV, VS (kdV), Id.Voter, VS (Id. Voter)]    (1) 
AdP [ ] It represents that all the information between the square brackets 
is ciphered with the Administrator’s public key. This information 
is made by the concatenation of all the elements separated by 
comas. 
KdV It is one of the keys generated inside the Java Card processed by 
cryptographic algorithms so as to prevent from further recognition 
of it that would link voter and vote. 
VS ( )  It represents that the information between the brackets is ciphered 
with the Voter private key 
Id. Voter It is the identification of the voter.  
To generate this piece of information and to obtain it from the card an applet must 
be installed on the Java Card in order to send the proper message to the 
Administrator. The applet must allow the execution of all the steps needed neither 
risking for data nor operations.  
5.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE APPLET IMPLEMENTED ON THE JAVA CARD 
The authorization request is a complex piece of information that is generated 
inside the card using its cryptographic features. As it has been previously stated, 
this piece of information has to be sent to the Administrator through the 
Authentication Point, but the Java Card has a narrow capacity of input/output 
buffering. Consequently, after the information is generated, a number of 
interactions will be required in order to extract the whole information from the 
Java Card toward the Authentication Point. 
 
Figure 6. Sequence of steps needed to generate the Authorization Request 
operation 
Voter
Card
Authentication 
Point 
1 
2, 3, 4 
5 
6 
7 
Voter’s identifier 
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Figure 6 shows the complete process to obtain and send the data to the 
Administrator. 
1. Authentication Point Æ Voter: Ask for the voter’s identifier. 
2. Authentication Point Æ Card: Ask for the generation of the keys to be 
used to cipher and decipher the vote. 
3. Authentication Point Æ Card: Ask for the storage of the provided 
Administrator’s public key. 
4. Authentication Point Æ Card: Ask for the generation of the Authorization 
Request. 
5. Card Æ Authentication Point: Answer to the request in the step four. If 
the operation was successfully executed, the piece of information consists 
of a number of blocks of 128 octets. The total number of blocks is reported 
in one of the parameters of the answer. If the operation could not be 
executed, such event is reported in a separated parameter. 
6. Authentication Point Æ Card: ith block request. 
7. Card Æ Authentication Point: ith block is sent back or an error is reported. 
Steps 6 and 7 are repeated until the whole message has been transferred. 
 
This sequence of operations shows the case in which a specific operation is 
carried out across the Authentication Point. The applet installed on the Java Card 
is able to return a number of octets in response to the proper request previously 
made by the Authentication Point. More than one interaction (step 6 and 7) will be 
needed due to the fact that the regular size of the Java Card input/output buffer is 
smaller than the regular size of the message –in spite of being 255 octets the 
maximum available in the chosen card, in this development we make use of only 
128 octets length so that performances are improved. The length of the message 
depends on the size of the ciphering keys. The RSA keys in this development are 
of 1024 bits, which result in a message of around 600 octets. The fact that the 
generation and extraction of data are separate operations forces the applet to 
require permanent storage space inside the card. Otherwise, the confidentiality of 
data would not be ensured. One of the most serious limitations of current smart 
card technology is the short memory space they have to store data. We have used 
the Sm@rt Café Expert Java Card from Giesecke & Devrient that implements a 
garbage collector in order to prevent the memory space limitation from being even 
more critical. Proceeding with large blocks of data that requires intermediate 
storage space for the operations could be an important drawback depending on the 
card that is used. 
To summarize: in order to generate the appropriate piece of information inside the 
Java Card and to send it to the Administrator, two main operations are required: 
a) Generation of the information piece. 
b) Extraction block by block of the whole generated piece of information. 
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The information that must be stored in the card is briefly commented in order to 
proceed with a detailed description of those operations. 
5.2 DATA STORED ON THE JAVA CARD 
Before generating the piece of information inside the Java Card, the voter 
identification and some keys must be supplied. The voter identification is the 
value of one parameter given to the applet by the APDU command related to the 
Authorization Request (step 4, Figure 6). Some of the keys needed for different 
operations are internally generated when required; whereas other keys are 
externally supplied as is the case of the Administrator public key in the previous 
example. 
For security reasons, the voter’s private and public keys must be generated inside 
the smart card to ensure a complete confidentiality of the private key that strongly 
identifies the identity of the voter. Private keys will never be read from the card, 
being only the applet able to manage them. This pair of keys must be generated in 
a stage previous to the electoral process. 
Asymmetrical keys used for ciphering and deciphering the vote are also internally 
generated because of similar considerations to those stated for voter’s private and 
public keys. 
There are two possible ways to provide the external public keys and the voter 
identifier. It is possible either to load it together with the applet, or to send it as a 
value of a parameter when the operation is requested. Our development makes use 
of the second option although we are currently working on the first one. 
5.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION 
REQUEST  
After receiving the APDU described in the previous paragraph, the applet begins 
the execution of the respective method. Inside the applet, there is a general 
method, called process, which is in charge of determining the type of operation to 
execute (from parameter INS of the APDU) and therefore the method that must be 
invoked.  
 
    /** 
     * Method that processes an incoming APDU. 
     * @see APDU 
     * @param apdu incoming APDU 
     * @exception ISOException according to ISO 7816-4 
     */ 
    public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException { 
        // gets the APDU 
        byte[] apduBuffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
 
        // select the method according to INS parameter 
        switch (apduBuffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS]) { 
   . 
   . 
   . 
           case INS_BUILT_ADMIN_DATA: 
             // checks if command is correct for this applet 
                if (apduBuffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA] != VOTER_CLA) 
                    ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
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                builtAdminData(apdu); 
                break; 
   . 
   . 
   . 
            default : 
                // Not supported command 
                ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
                break; 
        } 
    } 
 
The following operations are executed by builtAdminData in order to generate 
the piece of information addressed to the Administrator (this expression is shown 
in expression (1), Section 5): 
a) Verification of presence of the required keys. 
b) Initialization of the cipher to operate with the voter private key.  
c) Ciphering of the voter identifier received in the request.  
d) Ciphering of the KdV key.  
e) Concatenation of the voter identifier, the ciphered voter identifier, the KdV 
key and the ciphered KdV key.  
f) Initialization of the cipher to operate with the public key of the 
Administrator.  
g) Ciphering of the result of the concatenation 
5.4 OPERATION: SENDING OF THE GENERATED AUTHORIZATION 
REQUEST 
This operation permits to obtain all the blocks –one by one– belonging to a piece 
of information generated inside the card. Since the result must be divided in 128 
bytes blocks, the P1 parameter of the APDU indicates which block must be sent 
back. 
5.5 SEQUENCE OF APDUS  
Sm@rtCafé Professional Toolkit 2.0 from Giesecke & Devrient manufacturer has 
been used for the applets development. This tool provides the necessary elements 
for an applet development, such as card simulation, debugging, loading and 
verification of operation in the card. In Figure 7, obtained from the toolkit, the 
sequence of APDUs is shown. Numbers from 2 to 7 have been overlapped in 
order to show the correspondence between the steps numbers used in Figure 6 
(step 1 is omitted because it does not involve using of Java Card). 
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Figure 7. Sequence of APDUs  
 
Analyzing in detail one of the APDUs shown in Figure 7, i.e. the command that 
requests the preparation of data for the Administrator (operation 4), the different 
parts described in section 4.1 can be identified (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Example of the format of the APDU corresponding to the command 
Request of preparation of data for the Administrator 
 
As it can be noticed, the instruction is identified by means of a CLA=0x55 and a 
INS=0x44, so that the applet can determine which is the operation to execute. 
Parameters P1 and P2 that take the value 0x00, provide no further information. 
Because of the data contained by the APDU, we use the Lc field whose value 
(0x09) indicates that the field of data is composed of nine bytes. These nine bytes 
following the Lc parameter contain the voter identifier used by the applet to 
prepare the information to be sent to the Administrator. The last byte -the Le field- 
indicates that only one byte of data is expected in the answer to this command. 
o 
p 
q 
r s 
t 
ith block 
CLA 
INS
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P2
Lc Le Data
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Operation 5 shows the answer announcing that requested data will be completed 
with five blocks. 
Operation 6 shows the request of the first block (00) of the information piece to be 
sent to the Administrator, and operation 7 represents the response with the 
respective block. Next, the Authentication Point by means of new operations 
(similar to 6), will ask for subsequent blocks (00, 01 ... 04) and the card will 
answer by sending the proper response like 7. 
Through this example, we can observe the nature of atomic operations that are 
needed to implement the dialogue between the smart card and the computer which 
acts as a terminal of the system.  
As we stated in Section 3, Java Cards easily permit voter’s applications to be 
implemented by means of applets and they also permit to store this applets within 
memory card. The examples described above illustrate the behaviour of an applet 
that supports parts of a voter’s applications stored in a Java Card and 
demonstrates the feasibility of this kind of solution. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In telematic voting applications, the use of smart cards operating under public key 
algorithms offers great advantages to guarantee both the voting anonymity and the 
voter’s authentication. Since they are tamper-resistant, smart cards effectively 
protect personal keys of voters and the receipts generated after the voting. 
Smart cards that we call classic (those which conform to the ISO/IEC 7816 
standard) allow to easily introduce data in the customization phase but offer few 
opportunities for application designers to load new programs into the card 
memory. 
A new generation of smart cards, Java Cards, do allow to introduce in the card 
memory small applications (applets), codified in Java, which support most of the 
needed cryptographic operations, maintaining in total secrecy the keys used for 
such operations. 
Although the small size of Java Cards’ memory imposes certain limitations 
regarding the operations that can be carried out, adequate design and proper usage 
of existent tools permits to carry out complex and robust operations, which 
guarantee the global security of the system. 
J. Carracedo, A. Gómez, E. Pérez, J. Moreno and S. Sánchez 
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